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such a finding would be sufficient to 
validate the entry. [d. at 280l. 
The Court rejected Rodriguez's argu-
ment that permitting entry based on the 
"reasonable belief' of common author-
ity vicariously waives a defendant's 
fourth amendment rights. [d. The Court, 
in rejecting this contention, de-empha-
sized Rodriguez's waiver of his fourth 
amendment rights and highlighted the 
reasonableness of the officers' belief in 
Fischer's authority to consent. [d. at 
2800. The Court stated that "at issue in a 
claim where apparent consent is raised 
is not whether the right to be free of 
searches has been waived, but whether 
the right to be free of unreasonable 
searches has been violated." [d. at 2801 
(emphasis original). Noting that the 
fourth amendment is the source from 
which Rodriguez's trial rights regarding 
the exclusionary rule derives, the Court 
reasoned that to violate a defendant's 
rights against the admission of exclu-
sionary evidence, the fourth amendment 
itself must first be violated. [d. In analyz-
ing whether a fourth amendment viola-
tion occurred, the Court reasoned that 
the fourth amendment itself does not 
assure that a government search of a 
home will not occur, but assures only 
that an "unreasonable" search will not 
occur. [d. at 2799. 
As the Court stated in Schenckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), 
"[n]othing, either in the purposes be-
hind requiring a 'knowing' and'intelli-
gent' waiver of trial rights, or in the prac-
tical application of such a requirement 
suggests that it ought to be extended to 
the constitutional guarantee against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." Rod-
riguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2799 ( 1990) ( quot-
ing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
at 241 (1973)). The Rodriguez Court, 
therefore, reasoned that the fourth 
amendment only guaranteed Rodriguez 
protection against "unreasonable" 
governmental searches, not freedom 
from searches without his consent. 
Justice Marshall wrote a lengthy dis-
sent, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Stevens. The dissent contended that a 
search pursuant to an officer's reasona-
ble but erroneous belief that a third 
party had authority to consent differs 
from valid third party authority to con-
sent to governmental entry. [d. at 2802 
(Marshall, )., dissenting). The dissent 
reasoned that glvmg a third party 
authority to consent to entry limits an 
owner's ability to challenge the rea-
sonableness of a search because allow-
ing another person access to or control 
of property reduces an owner's expecta-
tion of privacy. [d. at 2802 (Marshall,)., 
dissenting). The dissent believed that 
where no actual relinquishment of access 
or control occurs, and a third party lacks 
actual authority to consent, there can-
not be an exception to the warrant 
requirement because there would re-
main an expectation of privacy. [d. The 
dissent reasoned that subjecting a per-
son to a warrantless search without 
authorized consent or exigency would 
erode the fourth amendment's protec-
tion of a home from "unreasonable" 
governmental intrusion. [d. at 2807 
(Marshall,)., dissenting). 
Rodriguez is significant in that it 
broadens the third party consent excep-
tion to the warrant requirement for 
entry into an individual's home. The 
practical effect of the decision is that if a 
third party convinces law enforcement 
officials of his apparent authority to con-
sent to entry, no warrant for entry will 
be required and thus, the homeowner's 
expectation of privacy will be dimin-
ished. In addition, Rodriguez illustrates 
the present Court's reluctance to res-
trict governmental action in drug related 
cases. 
- Daryl D. Jones 
In re Moore: DEBTORS' INTERESTS 
IN ERISA-QUALIFIED PROFIT-
SHARING AND PENSION PLAN 
BEYOND THE REACH OF 
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in [n re Moore, 907 
F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990) reconciled 
provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
with those of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974,29 U.S.c. 
§1001 et seq. (1976) (ERISA). The 
court found that debtors' interests in an 
ERISA-qualified profit-sharing and pen-
sion plan were not subject to turnover 
to the trustee in bankrutpcy, because 
ERISA constitutes applicable non-bank-
ruptcylaw. 
A number of employees of Springs 
Industries who participated in their 
company's comprehensive retirement 
program became involved in Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceedings. The program's 
Profit-Sharing and Pension Plan and 
Trust and Retirement Plan and Trust 
contained anti-assignment provisions 
which prohibited the employees from 
alienating their interests. The anti-
assignment provisions were necessary 
to qualify the employees' interests in the 
plans as ERISA funds and maintain their 
tax-exempt status. Under the plans, dis-
tributions were to be made to benefi-
ciaries "only upon retirement, disability 
or termination of service." Moore, 907 
F.2d at 1477. The debtors had received 
no distributions from the plans at the 
time they petitioned for bankruptcy and 
were not eligible to do so in the near 
future. 
The trustee in bankruptcy sought to 
compel the Profit-Sharing and Pension 
Plan and Trust administrator to tum 
over the employees' interests to the 
bankruptcy estates. The trustee argued 
that the interests in the plan were not 
subject to restrictions on transfer, be-
cause the plan was not a spendthrift 
trust under South Carolina law. Without 
addressing whether the plan was a spend-
thrift trust under South Carolina law, the 
bankruptcy court determined that since 
the plan was ERISA-qualified, the deb-
tors' interests in the plan were non-
alienable and thus excludable from the 
bankruptcyestates. 1hetrusteein bankruptcy 
appealed the decision. [d. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit noted that under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the property of a 
bankrupt's estate consists of" all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of 
the case." Moore, 907 F.2dat 1477 (cit-
ing 11 U.S.c. §541(a)(1)). However, 
the Code excludes the debtors' interests 
in certain trusts from their bankruptcy 
estates by recognizing restrictions on 
transfers of such interests. Specifically, 
"[ a] restriction on the transfer of a bene-
ficial interest of the debtor in a trust that 
is enforceable under applicable non-
bankruptcy law is enforceable in a case 
under this title." [d. (citing 11 U.S.c. 
§541( c )(2)). Thus, if ERISA constitutes 
applicable nonbankruptcy law, and the 
debtors' interests are enforceable under 
ERISA, the trustee would be precluded 
from reaching those interests. 
The trustee in bankruptcy argued that 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" under 
34-The law Forurn/21.2 ________________________________ _ 
section 541(c)(2) did not encompass 
the restrictions on alienation of plan 
benefits in 29 U.S.c. § 1 056( d)( 1). 
Rather, the trustee argued that the term 
referred "only to plans with transfer re-
strictions enforceable under state spend-
thrift trust law." Moore, 907 F.2d at 
1477. The court of appeals rejected the 
trustee's overly restrictive interpretation 
of section 541 ( c ) (2) and held that the 
term was not limited to state spendthrift 
trust law. Id. 
First, the court found nothing in the 
plain language of section 541 ( c)( 2) to 
suggest that the term "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" refers exclusively to 
state law. The court stated that the lan-
guage means exactly what it says, thus 
encompassing all laws, state and federal, 
under which a restriction on transfer 
can be enforced. Id 
Furthermore, the court found that the 
identical language in other provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code had been deter-
mined to apply to federal as well as state 
law. For example, in In re Ahead By a 
Length, Inc., lOO B.R 157 (Banke., 
S.D.N.Y. 1989), the bankruptcy court 
found "applicable nonbankruptcy law" 
within the provisions of 11 U.S.c. 
§ 1 08( a) to include, inter alia, the Rack-
eteer Influence and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act. The court thus concluded that 
it would be "incongruous to give the 
same phrase in Section 541(c)(2) a 
narrower construction than the identi-
cal phrase other parts of the Bankruptcy 
Code, particularly since the disparate 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code were 
enacted together in a single compre-
hensive statute." Moore, 907 F.2d at 
1478. The court further concluded that, 
had Congress intended the term "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law" to encom-
pass only state law, it would have stated 
so explicitly, as it had in other sections 
oftheCode.Id. (citing 11 US.c. §522(b) 
(1) & (2)). 
Acknowledging the trustee's argu-
ment that several circuit courts have 
determined the term "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2) 
to refer only to state spendthrift trust 
laws, the court distinguished those de-
cisions as involving self-settled trusts 
where the settlor was the beneficiary 
and had powers to amend or terminate 
the trust without penalty. Id In contrast, 
the beneficiaries of the Springs Indus-
tries' plan could not control the trust, 
could not borrow against it, and could 
not amend the trust. 
The court also rejected the trustee's 
appeal to the legislative history of sec-
tion 541(c)(2), finding such an ap-
proach inappropriate, since tl:te language 
of the statute was clear. Id. at 1478-79. 
Furthermore, the court noted that even 
if a review of the legislative history were 
relevant, it would be inconclusive. The 
court found that Congress' repeated 
emphasis on state spendthrift trust law 
in the legislative reports accompanying 
section 541(c)(2) indicated merely its 
intentions to include state spendthrift 
law within the restrictions of transfer 
enforceable under "applicable nonbank-
ruptcylaw." Id. at 1479. Thus,foundthe 
court, Congress was treating interests in 
plans containing valid spendthrift clauses 
in the same way as prior to the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, when such 
interests were not property of the bank-
rupt's estate. Id. The court reiterated, 
"[ n ]othing in the legislative history indi-
cates ... that Congress meant 'applicable 
nonbankruptcy law' to refer exclusively 
to state spendthrift trust law." Id. 
Having concluded that the term "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law" may include 
federal law, the court went on to con-
sider the issue of whether ERISA consti-
tutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" 
so that the debtors' interests in the 
ERISA-qualified plan were properly ex-
cluded from the estates under section 
541(c)(2). The court found that the 
primary purpose of ERISA was to secure 
employees' retirement income so that a 
worker promised a retirement benefit 
would actually receive it. Id. ERISA 
secures pension benefits primarily by 
restricting the assignment and aliena-
tion of those benefits. Id. at 1480. Be-
cause these non-alienability provisions 
deny general creditors, as well as plan 
participants, access to vested benefits, 
the court concluded that ERISA "consti-
tutes 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' 
under which restrictions on the transfer 
of pension interests may be enforced." 
Id. Thus, the court concluded, "'[u]nder 
the plain and simple language of section 
541 ( c)( 2), if the ERISA anti-alienation 
provisions are enforceable against gen-
eral creditors, they are enforceable 
against the bankruptcy trustee. '" Id. 
at 1478 (quotingIn re Threewitt, 24 B.R 
927,929 (D. Kan. 1982)). 
In finding ERISA to constitute appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law within the 
meaning of section 541(c)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
ensured that neither the vagaries of state 
laws, nor the particularities of state 
spendthrift trust law would continue to 
threaten the security of employee retire-
ment benefits, thus furthering ERISA's 
purpose of uniform treatment of pen-
sion benefits across the country. 
- Mary Jo Murphy 
Mandel tJ. O'Hara: GOVERNOR 
ENJOYS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
BASED ON APPROVAL OR VETO 
OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS. 
In Mandel v. O'Hara, 320 Md. 103, 
576 A.2d 766 (1990), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that a gover-
nor could not be held liable for damages 
in tort based upon his veto or approval 
of legislation. The absolute immunity is 
of the same type which members of the 
General Assembly enjoy when voting for 
or against legislative bills and applies 
even if corrupt motives underlie the 
exercise of power. 
During 1971, Marlboro racetrack 
made an agreement to buy eighteen rac-
ing days from another track which con-
ducted horse racing with parimutuel 
betting. The General Assembly approved 
the transfer which subsequently was 
vetoed by Governor Mandel. As a result, 
James F. O'Hara, III and Michael P. 
O'Hara sold their stock in Marlboro. 
Thereafter, the General Assembly over-
rode the veto and Marlboro merged 
with another entity that conducted horse 
racing with parimutuel betting. 
The O'Haras brought suit against the 
governor and others, based on a theory 
of conspiracy. They contended that by 
vetoing the bill, Governor Mandel plan-
ned to depress the value of the Marlboro 
stock, acquire the stock, then restore its 
value by inducing the General Assembly 
to override the veto. At trial, the gover-
nor's motion for su~ary judgment 
based on absolute immunity was denied. 
Governor Mandel appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland where he 
was granted a stay. The court of appeals 
granted certiorari before determination 
on the merits to determine if a Governor 
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